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TRANSPORT NETWORK VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
BASED ON TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT METHODS 
Miroslav Slivoně1 
Summary: This paper discusses the possibility of use of two traffic assignment approaches 
to solve the problem of identification of vulnerable links. The first method is based 
on Dial’s algorithm originally used to solve the stochastic traffic assignment 
problem. The second method calculates the costs experienced by all the network 
users according to the user equilibrium assignment (before and after particular link 
failure). This approach is not new but not commonly used because of its high 
computation complexity; this complexity can be considerably reduced using 
the subnetwork approach. There are proposed some new modifications 
of the subnetwork approach which could reduce the complexity of the original idea.  
Key words:  transport network vulnerability, traffic assignment, stochastic assignment, user 
equilibrium. 
 
1. THE BASIC CONCEPT OF THE NETWORK VULNERABILITY 
There have been proposed different definitions of the network vulnerability 
by the scientific community [1], [2]. This paper supposes following concept of network link 
vulnerability: The link on network is vulnerable when the consequences of its failure are 
severe, irrespective of the probability of the failure. 
The total consequences TCl of failure of link l can be expresses like the sum of direct 
and indirect consequences [3]: 
lll ICDCTC += ,          (1) 
where: 
DCl  are direct financial costs (needed to repair the link), 
ICl  are indirect generalized financial costs induced by the link failure. 
 
The measure of direct financial costs is out of scope of this paper. These costs will be 
extremely high especially for technically difficult infrastructure objects like bridges 
or tunnels. The repair process of such objects will be also very time consuming, so 
the duration of the failure is supposed to be long. This fact has negative impact on the total 
size of indirect costs.  
 The indirect consequences experienced by network users can be measured mainly 
by means of additional travel distance and additional travel time.  
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The total additional travel distance can be expressed like: 
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where: 
fij  is the size of transport demand, i.e. number of trips from zone i to zone j, 
dijl is the average travel distance when the link l is broken,  
dij  is the average travel distance under normal conditions. 
 
The total additional travel time can be expresses like: 
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where: 
tijl is the average travel time when the link l is broken,  
tij  is the average travel time under normal conditions. 
 
The travel distances and travel times are assumed to be the average values. 
In dependence on selected traffic assignment model these distances or times are not necessary 
equal for all users.  
The indirect consequences can be then calculated like: 
TlDll cTTcTDIC ⋅+⋅= ΔΔ ,         (4) 
where: 
cD are the costs of driving one distance unit, 
 cT are the costs of one unit of driving time. 
 
Failure of some links can lead to separation of some part of the network. These links are 
called cut-links (which corresponds to the term “bridge” used in graph theory). In case of cut-
link failure, both TDlΔ and TTlΔ equal to infinity. By this reason the cut-links should be 
indentified prior to measuring link vulnerability of network. Importance of such a cut-link can 
be measured by total unsatisfied demand Ul [4]:  
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The idea of the concept of network vulnerability presented above is simple; however 
the measure of the vulnerability of all the links can be very time consuming. In many practical 
applications of the network vulnerability analysis this required computation time makes 
hundreds of days [3]. The calculation time depends mainly on: 
• the size of network – a realistic transport network contains tens of thousands of nodes and 
links, 
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• the traffic assignment model used and its setting – besides the simplest unrealistic models, 
it takes quite a long time to solve most of variants of traffic assignment problem. 
 
2. EXISTING VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS VARIANTS BASED 
ON TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT MODELS 
2.1. Stochastic traffic assignment without capacity constraints 
This kind of traffic assignment was intensively studied in the literature during past 
decades. Some of the models assume Gaussian distribution to express the error 
in the perceived travel time – these methods are called probit based assignment methods 
and the computation of assignment is usually made by Monte Carlo method. Other models 
assume the distribution of the perceived travel time error to be Gumbel’s – they are called 
logit based and the assignment can be computed explicitly. Probably the most common logit 
based method was proposed by Dial [5]; Taylor [1] used Dial’s algorithm to identify 
vulnerable links.  
As was stated above, the network users in Dial’s algorithm do not always decide 
for the minimum costs path – they decide according to logit formula: 
∑
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 where: 
 pr is the probability that user choose the route r, 
 tr is the travel time spend on route r (can be also distance or generalized costs), 
 α is the parameter which expresses the user’s sensitivity to travel time. 
 
To avoid the need of the enumeration of all the paths from origin to destination, the path 
acceptability criterion is added to the model. The path from origin i to destination j is 
acceptable only when each link (r, s) on this path satisfies tir < tis; i.e. travel time from origin i 
to initial node r of this link must be higher than travel time from origin i to terminal node s 
of the link. 
 
The algorithm works this way: 
STEP 1 
Calculate the link weights wrs and node weights Ws according to given formulas: 
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These weights can be computed recursively from the destination node j in the forward 
topological order – it means by increasing the value of tsj from node j. 
 
STEP 2 
Compute conditional probabilities P{(r, s) / r}: 
r
rs
W
w
rsrP =}/),{( .          (10) 
Then assign flow to network according to these probabilities. 
 
Discussion, possibilities of use in vulnerability analysis 
These two steps must be repeated for each origin – destination pair. Taylor [1] does not 
assign the flow to network; the conditional probabilities are used as indicators of link 
vulnerability. The higher is the link probability, the greater are the consequences on the origin 
– destination pair i, j if the link is broken. 
Dial’s method can be used even in the realistic large networks. The algorithm has two 
time demanding parts: the computation of the distances of all nodes from path’s initial node 
and the sorting of nodes in forward topological order. This can be done in acceptable time 
using fast shortest path algorithm (e.g. Dijkstra or A* with binary heap) and fast sorting 
algorithm (e.g. binary heap). 
The described method of stochastic traffic assignment can be used to compute indirect 
link failure consequences according to equitation (4). However the results will not be realistic 
because the link capacity restraint (congestion effect) is not included.  
 
2.2. Deterministic traffic assignment with capacity constraints 
The model which involves the link capacity restraints and the first Wardrop’s principle 
is called deterministic user equilibrium (DUE) traffic assignment.  
The link capacity constraints can be expressed by some link travel time function; probably 
the most frequently used function is this BRP formula: 
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 where: 
  va  is the actual link flow, 
αa  is the free-flow travel time, 
ca  is the capacity of link a, 
βa, γa  are parameters calibrated for link a. 
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The Wardrop’s principle mentioned above says: “Under equilibrium conditions traffic 
arranges itself in congested networks in such a way that no individual trip maker can reduce 
his path costs by switching routes.” 
The DUE traffic assignment problem is stated like: 
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 where: 
 R  is the set of all routes in the network, 
W  is the set of all origin - destination (O-D) pairs, 
Rw  is the set of all routes between O-D pair w∈W,  
qw  is the demand between O-D pair w∈W, 
r
wf  is the flow on the route r∈R, 
w
arδ  equals 1 if route r between O-D pair w uses link a and 0 otherwise. 
 
The DUE problem can be solved using well-know Frank-Wolfe algorithm or some other 
alternative like DSD, MSA, Dial’s algorithm B [6]. This approach matches best the idea 
of indirect consequences according to formula (4). Unfortunately the computation time will 
be rather high in large network.  
 
Discussion, possibilities of use in vulnerability analysis 
Interesting approach how to reduce time complexity of vulnerability analysis based 
on DUE assignment was presented in [3]. The authors used local subnetworks instead 
of the whole network – the whole idea is based on the fact that the main part of the links 
serves only little demand with rather short average path distances. Hence the redistribution 
effect in dense parts of network will be spatially restricted. 
Such a subnetwork was a limited section cut from the complete network including 
the section’s internal and transit demand (resulting from DUE assignment made using whole 
network). The subnetworks were generated using 60 km edge length and an offset of half 
an edge length – so every link was at least 15 km far from nearest subnetwork border. Failure 
consequences calculated using subnetworks were compared against those consequences 
assessed using the full network. The subnetwork methodology approved to be very accurate 
and reliable and the time gain was substantial (in case of the Swiss national transport network 
with approx. 30 300 undirected links and 24 300 nodes: 40 minutes for the whole network, 
35 seconds for one 60 km subnetwork). However, the 60 km subnetwork was not used 
for national class of roads (which serves long distance O-D relations; in this case the whole 
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network was considered) and for sparse Alps areas (long length of detour; special large Alps 
subnetwork used); for cut links was used formula (5). 
 
3. BRIEF PROPOSALS OF MODIFIED LINK VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
APPROACH 
Although the method proposed in [3] approved itself to work very well, it could be 
improved by following modifications. These improvements could positively affect the model 
precision and its computation complexity. 
 
Modification 1 (use of link radii) 
The original method works with national, cantonal and municipal roads different way. 
The upper level of the hierarchy is supposed to serve for long distance trips and the whole 
network is involved. The lower level of the hierarchy serves especially for small distance trips 
and the subnetwork of constant size is used. Although this is valid in most cases, there is 
a better way how to work with link hierarchy. 
The original approach considered a discrete number of hierarchy levels. Algorithm 
described in [7] uses continuous range of hierarchy levels. Ertl’s radii algorithm is originally 
intended to reduce the searching space during shortest path calculation in large network. 
However the same idea can be used also for the purposes of link vulnerability analysis – 
the size of subnetwork can be set according to the link radius. 
Each directed link has an associated radius. If a link has the radius Rl, it means that 
every shortest path over this edge either starts or ends in a node which has a distance smaller 
than Rl from the starting node of this link. 
These link radii can be computed for most of the links exactly using this subnetwork 
approach: the network is covered by overlapping rectangles so that each rectangle contains 
about 2 000 nodes. The distance matrixes for these subnetworks are created and the radii can 
be estimated for 75 - 85 % of links. With this algorithm it is not possible to calculate all link 
radii – if the radius of a link is larger than the rectangle size it equals to infinity. For these 
links at least upper radii bounds can be calculated using the entire network which does not 
contain links with known radii. 
The link radius is definitely better representation of the usability of link for long 
distance trips than a link category alone. The subnetwork rectangle edge size can be estimated 
from link radius - the rectangle should contain the whole radius plus some addition to cover 
the redistribution effect. The appropriate subnetwork (its edge size and positioning) can 
be selected from set of subnetworks created in advance (see modification 2). 
 
Modification 2 (creation of set of subnetworks of various size in advance) 
The link radius approach allows to use subnetwork of required size. Prior to subnetwork 
creation the DUE traffic assignment needs to be solved to build up the subnetwork’s transit 
demand. All the path redistribution is supposed to be made internally - within the subnetwork. 
The process of aggregation of transit demand from particular paths is quite time demanding – 
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so it seems like a good idea to create a set of overlaying subnetworks of different sizes 
in advance and store them in the computer’s hard drive. Then for each link the best 
subnetwork is chosen (the link should be located in the central area and should have the right 
size). 
 
Use of the stochastic assignment 
The stochastic assignment approach works faster compared to the DUE assignment. 
The subnetwork approach and link radii approach can be also used to accelerate the algorithm. 
The links identified to be vulnerable could be examined also using DUE assignment. 
The research of affinity of results reached by both methods in real networks appears 
to be very interesting. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The proposals suggested above will be objects of future analysis. Computer model 
which involves creation of subnetworks and both traffic assignment approaches is created 
in these days. The results of this analysis will be published soon. 
 
5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This paper has been supported by the Institutional research MSM 0021627505 
„Theory of Transport Systems“. 
LITERATURE 
[1] D’ESTE, G. M. D., TAYLOR, M. A. P, Network Vulnerability: An Approach 
to Reliability Analysis at the Level of National Strategic Transport Networks, 
In Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Transport Network Reliability, 
Oxford (2003). 
[2] BERDICA, K., An introduction to road vulnerability: what has been done, is done 
and should be done. Transport Policy, 9, (2002). 
[3] ERATH, A., BIRDSALL, J., AXHAUSEN, K.W., HAJDIN, R., Vulnerability assessment 
Methodology for Swiss Road Network. Transportation Research Record: Journal 
of the Transportation Research Board, vol. 2139 (2009). 
[4] JENELIUS, E., PETERSEN, T., MATTSSON, L.G., Importance and Exposure in Road 
Network Vulnerability Analysis. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 
(2006). 
[5] DIAL, R. B., A probabilistic multipath traffic assignment model which obviates the need 
for path enumerationm, Transporatation Research, 5 (1971).  
[6] PATRIKSSON, M. The Traffic Assignment Problem: Models and Methods. Utrecht: VSP, 
(1994). 
[7] ERTL, G.: Shortest Path Calculation in Large Road Networks. OR Spectrum, Springer-
Verlag, (1998). 
